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9.1 Introduction
In Japan, drugs account for an enormous proportion of health care
costs. Of the ﬁve major developed countries listed in table 9.1, Japan and
France have the highest absolute per-patient cost of drugs, spending three
times as much as England, twice as much as the United States, and one and
a half times as much as Germany. Japan consistently ranks at the top in
terms of the share of drugs in total health care costs, spending more than
20 percent on drugs according to the Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD) Health Data (1998, table 9.2).
According to the 1996 Survey on Socialized Medicine (Ministry of
Health and Welfare 1994–1996)1 injections account for as great a share of
inpatient costs as do surgeries (9.5 percent and 9.4 percent, respectively),
while drugs and injections together consume 39.6 percent of outpatient
health care costs. Although drugs are a very important component of to-
tal health care expenditures in Japan, their importance seems to be heavily
concentrated in the outpatient care of elderly patients. In inpatient care,
drugs account for only 12.8 percent of the diﬀerence in average costs be-
tween the elderly and the rest of the population. In outpatient care, drugs
account for 56 percent of this diﬀerence. Given the rapid aging of the
Japanese population, it is clear that if we do not ﬁnd some way to control
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1. This survey, based on approximately 300,000 reimbursement claims submitted by health
care providers, is published annually by the Ministry of Health and Welfare.the cost of drugs, we will not be able to control health care expenditures in
the twenty-ﬁrst century.
Why do we spend so much on drugs? The ﬁrst place to look for an an-
swer is in the enormous distortions generated by drug price regulations
during the last ﬁve decades. Although the entire health care sector lies out-
side the realm of the market economy (the government sets comprehensive
reimbursement prices for individual health care services in an attempt to
control every possible aspect of health care service delivery), these regula-
tions on drug prices are very peculiar. Regulated drug prices vary by brand
name even if they are chemically identical. In general, when the govern-
ment purchases any other good or service it must observe a set of very
stringent procurement procedures designed to assure the lowest possible
price. With drugs, physicians are allowed to use more expensive brand-
name drugs when cheaper alternatives are available, even though they are
supposed to be acting as agents of the government.
Second, the government sets reimbursement (retail) prices on the basis
of market (wholesale) prices from almost eighteen months earlier, and
these retail prices are then ﬁxed for the following two years. If the market
functioned normally, such regulation would be a source of enormous risk
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Table 9.1 International Health Care and Drug Expenditures, 1993
Share of All Drugs 
National Health Outpatient Drug Inpatient Drug in National Health 
Care Expenditures Expenditures Expenditures Care Expenditure 
(yen per capita) (yen per patient) (yen per patient) (%)
France 253,680 43,375 50,375 19.9
Germany 224,420 32,195 38,283 17.1
England 110,625 16,341 18,153 16.4
United States 312,755 23,076 35,418 11.3
Japan 195,217 43,533 57,589 29.5
Source: Illustrated White Paper on Health Insurance (1998).
Note: Data for England are from 1992. Exchange rates: 23 yen/franc, 79 yen/deutsche mark, 231
yen/pound, and 122 yen/dollar.
Table 9.2 Share of Drugs in National Health Care Costs, 1990–1998 (%)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
France 16.7 16.7 16.6 16.8 16.6 16.7 17.0 16.7
Germany 14.2 14.3 14.2 12.4 12.3 12.3 12.7 12.6
England 13.8 14.0 14.5 15.3 15.3 15.9 16.5 17.3
United States 8.6 8.5 8.5 8.4 8.4 8.6 8.8 7.8
Japan 21.4 22.8 21.9 22.1 20.9 20.2 20.8 20.0
Source: 1998 OECD Health Datafor health care providers. In other words, the market structure must be very
peculiar for such a system to have functioned without driving a large num-
ber of providers to bankruptcy.
Third, drug markets are very tightly regulated and protected by ex-
tremely high barriers to new entry. The regulations concerning the intro-
duction of new drugs work as prohibitive barriers to entry, as they are both
very time consuming and costly. At the same time, these high barriers make
it easy for insiders to set noncompetitive prices and to build cozy relation-
ships with regulators.
In this paper, we present evidence regarding the eﬀects of price distor-
tions on resource allocation in the health care sector. Our estimates indi-
cate that the magnitude of these eﬀects exceeds 20 percent, and may be as
high as 50 percent, of drug costs. We then show that the government’s at-
tempts to control drug prices directly are at best ineﬀective, as they have
been oﬀset by drug-switching eﬀects in most drug groups. These drug-
switching eﬀects are in turn induced by the built-in proﬁt margins for
“new” drugs, which are generously priced by regulators. We base our con-
clusions on statistical analyses of the ﬁrst comprehensive microdata set
compiled in Japan.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In section 9.2, we review the
drug price controls of the last decade and classify the economic ineﬃcien-
cies associated with these controls; in section 9.3, we analyze the drug se-
lection behavior of physicians; in section 9.4, we present a decomposition
analysis of drug costs; in section 9.5, we discuss various reform proposals
currently under consideration; section 9.6 concludes.
9.2 Drug Pricing in the Japanese Health Care System
As all drugs are privately produced, health care service providers must
purchase all necessary drugs through the market. Trading is free for almost
all drugs, and market prices are formed on the basis of reimbursement
prices. In eﬀect, the reimbursement prices are the drugs’ retail prices and
market prices are the drugs’ wholesale prices, generating proﬁt margins for
each drug.
9.2.1 Formula for Drug Price Revisions
The Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) updates the list of reim-
bursement prices for individual drugs approximately every two years using
its Survey of Drug Prices.2 The current list of drugs contains almost 14,000
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2. In the Survey of Drug Prices, the government collects data on the actual purchase prices
of individual drugs from health care providers. The survey’s objectivity, however, is somewhat
weakened because it is announced well in advance and data are collected for just one month
(usually September).diﬀerent drugs. For nearly ten years, the government has been using the
following formula to revise the reimbursement prices:3
(1) Yt   Xt 1   rtYt 1,
where
Yt: New drug price,
Xt–1:A verage market price in the Survey of Drug Prices,
rt:R easonable zone factor (0   rt   1), and
Y t–1: Old drug price.
Once a new price is set, it is ﬁxed for the next two years. Hence, at least
in theory, providers take on the considerable risk of market price variation
in drug prices. In the last ten years of practice, however, once the new prices
are announced almost all market prices have continuously declined. As a
result, providers enjoy positive proﬁt margins on almost all drugs and so
have an economic incentive to sell as many drugs as possible to their pa-
tients. There are two reasons for this: the reasonable zone factor and the
generous price setting for “new” drugs.
9.2.2 Drug Pricing Rules
If we subtract old drug prices from both sides of equation (1), we obtain
(2) Yt   Yt 1    (Yt 1   Xt 1)   rtYt 1.
By dividing both sides by old drug prices, we obtain the revision formula
in proportion terms
(3) yt 1      t 1   rt,
where yt–1 is the rate of change of the reimbursement price of the drug and
 t–1 is the discount rate the ﬁrm oﬀered to providers in the previous period.














In the absence of the reasonable zone factor, equation (5) implies that if a
ﬁrm oﬀers a discount to promote the sale of a drug, that drug’s price is per-
manently lowered. Such a prospect should make the ﬁrm hesitant to oﬀer a
discount. With the reasonable zone factor, however, the ﬁrm can oﬀer price
discounts without endangering future proﬁtability, provided that the dis-
count rate remains within the range of the reasonable zone factor.
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3. Strictly speaking, this formula has only been adopted for all drugs since 1992. Prior to
that time, “bulk-line” formulas were used.Recently,  however, the government has been forced to rapidly reduce
both drug prices4 and reasonable zone factors in an attempt to control
health care costs, particularly those of the elderly. The zone factor dropped
from 15 percent in 1992 to 13 percent in 1994, 11 percent in 1996, 10 per-
cent in 1997, and 5 percent in 1998. Starting in 1997, an even lower rate was
applied to “new” drugs with chemical components similar to existing
drugs: 8 percent in 1997 and 2 percent in 1998.
9.2.3 Assessing Price Regulations: Decomposition
of the Variation in the Cost of Drugs
As we have shown, Japanese drug price regulation has a built-in price re-
duction mechanism. If there were no change in quantity used, price would
change at exactly the same rate as cost. The overall cost of drugs in public
health insurance, however, follows two-year cycles, showing decreases in
the years of price revisions and increases in the years following price revi-
sions (table 9.3). Many (Ikegami et al. 1998; Ogura 1996, 1998) believe that
this pattern is explained by the combination of two trends working against
the cut in drug prices: increasing reliance on multiple drugs and overall
switching to more expensive drugs. Some add a third trend of switching to
new expensive drugs. As far as we know, however, no one has quantiﬁed
these trends using comprehensive drug-usage data.
Five-Factor Decomposition
We decompose the variation in drug costs using the following ﬁve fac-
tors: (a) prescription probability factor; (b) drug-switching factor; (c) price
regulation factor; (d) daily quantity factor; and (e) number of days pre-
scribed factor. All drugs are classiﬁed at the three-digit level. The per-
patient average cost of drugs in group k in period t is denoted vk(t); vk(t) is
the product of   k(t), the probability that any drug in group k is prescribed;
and  k(t) is the per-patient cost of drugs in group k (given that at least one





vk(t)    k(t) k(t).
The per-patient cost,  k(t), is in turn the product of four factors (summed
over all i): si(t), the probability of selecting drug i in group k; pi(t), the re-
imbursement price of drug i; xi(t), the daily quantity of drug i; and di(t), the
number of days that drug i is used. Or,
 k(t)  ∑
i
si(t)pi(t)xi(t)di(t).
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)Note that the sum of the si(t) terms, each of which represents the probabil-
ity of selecting drug i conditional on prescribing some drug in group k,
equals one.
Given the above formulation, the variation in vk(t) is determined by the
variation in the ﬁve component variables. The proportional rate of change
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In words, we oﬀer the following explanation:
1. The ﬁrst term is the rate of change in the probability of prescribing
drugs in group k. The trend toward relying on more groups of drugs is
found by summing the ﬁrst term over all the drug groups.
2. The second term is the drug-switching eﬀect within group k, or the
rate of change in the per-patient cost of drugs as a result of changes in drug
selection. The trend of switching to expensive drugs is observed directly in
the second term.
3. The third term is the price regulation eﬀect in group k, or the rate of
change in the per-patient cost of drugs as a result of changes in regulated
drug prices. This is the government’s control variable, and the sum of the
third term over all the drug groups should be close to the rate the govern-
ment announces.
4. The fourth term is the rate of change in the per-patient cost of drugs
as a result of changes in daily quantities.
5. The ﬁfth term is the rate of change in the per-patient cost of drugs as
a result of changes in the number of days for which drugs are prescribed.
Data: Modiﬁcation and Errors
We use the 1994, 1995, and 1996 Survey of Drugsfor our analysis (MHW).
The data are described in detail in section 9.3.2. There are two groups of
claims that are dropped from the original data sets. First, we exclude all
claims submitted by drug stores because they do not include patient identi-
ﬁcation numbers. Second, we exclude observations above the 99th per-
centile in each three-digit group in terms of daily quantities. We make this
exclusion because of the extremely large variance in daily quantities for
some groups. The descriptive statistics for our sample are given in table 9.4.
∑i si(t)pi(t)xi(t) di(t)
   
∑i si(t)pi(t)xi(t)di(t)
∑i si(t)pi(t) xi(t)di(t)
   
∑i si(t)pi(t)xi(t)di(t)
∑i si(t) pi(t)xi(t)di(t)
   
∑i si(t)pi(t)xi(t)di(t)
∑i  si(t)pi(t)xi(t)di(t)
   
∑i si(t)pi(t)xi(t)di(t)






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.We still have to deal with two problems that plague any attempt to use
indexes: what to do with drugs introduced into and removed from our
sample. Drugs that are introduced for the ﬁrst time in period t do not have
data in period t – 1, including price data. Drugs that are removed in period
t do not have data in period t   1, including price data. If we exclude both
of them, we lose a signiﬁcant part of total drug costs from our analysis, but
if we include them we will no longer have an identity.
In the end, we have chosen inclusion with some modiﬁcation. For the
prescription factor and the drug-switching factor terms, we include both
introduced and removed drugs. For the price regulation factor, daily quan-
tity factor, and number of days prescribed factor terms, we include neither.
This is the main reason for the nonnegligible residuals obtained in the de-
composition analysis in certain cases.
Results
The decomposition analyses have been carried out for all three-digit
groups. Table 9.5 reports aggregated results (the sum of all drugs) with
breakdowns for some provider and regional characteristics.
Results for All Drugs.Between 1994 and 1995, when there were no revisions
of drug prices, the average cost of drugs increased by 5.1 percent. Accord-
ing to our decomposition, changes in the prescription probability in-
creased the cost of drugs by 1.7 percent. The drug-switching eﬀect in-
creased the cost of drugs by 5.4 percent, while changes in daily quantities
decreased the cost of drugs by 0.7 percent. Finally, changes in the number
of days prescribed increased the cost of drugs by 1.5 percent. The errors
therefore amount to –2.8 percent.
Between 1995 and 1996, when drug prices were revised, average drug
costs fell by 9.7 percent. The reduction in drug prices decreased the cost of
drugs by 7.7 percent, and changes in the prescription probability decreased
the cost of drugs another 7.0 percent. The drug-switching eﬀect increased
the cost of drugs by 7.1 percent, changes in daily quantity increased the
cost of drugs by 0.2 percent, and changes in the number of days prescribed
decreased the cost of drugs by 0.1 percent.
Price Controls and Drug-switching Eﬀects. The magnitudes of drug-
switching eﬀects are particularly important as an indicator of the eﬀective-
ness of drug price regulation. In table 9.6we report the percentage changes
in price in 1996 for ten major three-digit groups, as well as the drug-
switching eﬀects in 1995 and 1996. Our ten major groups account for al-
most 40 percent of the cost of drugs in 1995, and changes in their prices
were enough to drive drug costs down by 3.3 percent. However, the drug-
switching eﬀects in these groups in 1995 and 1996 together drove drug costs
Why Do the Japanese Spend So Much on Drugs? 237Table 9.5 Drug Cost Variation Decompositions, 1994–1995 and 1995–1996 (%)
Change Change
in Total Change in Drug Change Change in Number
Drug Prescription Switching in Drug in Daily of Days
Costs Probability Eﬀect Prices Quantity Taken Error
1994–1995
Total 5.1 1.7 5.4 –0.7 1.5 –2.8
Inpatient care 5.1 0.8 5.4 –1.5 1.9 –1.6
Outpatient care 5.1 1.5 8.3 0.9 1.4 –7.0
Ownership
National/public 4.9 4.7 4.4 2.7 3.1 –9.9
Private 4.2 2.5 6.8 5.1 1.5 –11.6
University –11.3 9.9 22.3 –0.8 –1.5 –41.2
Clinic with beds 0.8 –1.6 4.4 –1.4 7.3 –8.0
Clinic without beds 6.8 4.3 6.3 9.1 3.6 –16.5
Number of beds
0 4.2 3.8 6.1 5.9 2.3 –14.0
 200 5.4 3.4 3.0 –2.6 10.9 –9.3
 200 1.7 2.4 7.2 10.7 0.2 –18.9
Number of patients 
per physician
 100 0.7 –0.9 2.0 15.4 2.1 –17.9
100–200 7.9 6.3 13.4 1.0 1.5 –14.4
 200 and  400 16.3 10.9 4.1 –0.2 6.5 –5.0
 400 9.0 12.4 51.7 –3.1 –0.9 51.1
Region
Hokkaido –0.2 14.1 9.0 –3.5 3.7 –23.6
Tohoku 8.1 8.9 13.0 –1.0 –1.4 –11.4
Kanto –7.3 2.6 1.1 12.9 –3.3 –20.7
Hokuriku –24.9 –6.4 27.5 –1.4 3.4 –48.0
Chubu-Tokai 8.2 4.4 28.4 –3.1 3.6 –25.3
Kinki 12.1 3.0 11.2 24.8 3.2 –30.1
Chugoku –6.6 –0.8 8.3 –0.1 5.3 –19.2
Sikoku 10.2 18.3 13.6 –1.0 23.1 –43.8
Kyosyu 14.3 13.4 3.3 –3.5 7.6 –6.5
1995–1996
Total –9.7 –7.0 7.0 –7.7 0.2 –0.1 –2.2
Inpatient care –9.8 –6.1 5.3 –7.2 –0.2 0.0 –1.6
Outpatient care –9.6 –5.2 7.1 –7.9 1.0 –0.1 –4.5
Ownership
National/public –5.2 1.1 16.8 –7.2 –2.4 0.0 –13.6
Private –16.8 –9.9 8.7 –8.1 0.7 0.4 –8.5
University 9.2 11.0 30.4 –5.4 –2.6 4.2 –28.4
Clinic with beds –8.2 –3.7 10.6 –8.8 2.5 –1.2 –7.5
Clinic without beds –13.8 –7.2 6.3 –8.6 2.2 –1.5 –5.0
Number of beds
0– 14.5 –7.1 7.0 –8.6 1.1 –1.9 –5.0
 200 –5.9 –5.9 46.8 –8.7 2.3 –1.8 –38.6
 200 –3.7 2.8 6.7 –7.0 –4.6 4.4 –6.0Why Do the Japanese Spend So Much on Drugs? 239
Table 9.5 (continued)
Change Change
in Total Change in Drug Change Change in Number
Drug Prescription Switching in Drug in Daily of Days
Costs Probability Eﬀect Prices Quantity Taken Error
Number of patients 
per physician
 100 –7.3 –3.2 10.8 –7.4 –1.4 5.6 –11.7
100–200 –9.5 –1.2 8.8 –7.7 1.1 –1.0 –9.5
 200 and  400 –9.2 –4.2 6.8 –8.2 2.3 –0.3 –5.4
 400 –11.8 –4.5 4.2 –8.8 1.0 4.1 –7.7
Region
Hokkaido 0.8 –0.2 15.6 –8.2 2.2 2.6 –11.2
Tohoku –16.9 16.0 4.7 –7.9 –0.6 4.7 –33.8
Kanto –2.4 27.2 18.2 –7.5 –0.8 4.8 –44.3
Hokuriku 5.3 461.3 9.5 –8.2 1.1 3.1 –461.5
Chubu-Tokai –16.8 –7.0 2.7 –8.5 0.6 –0.8 –3.8
Kinki –13.2 –2.3 9.1 –8.0 –1.1 4.0 –14.8
Chugoku –5.3 3.4 5.4 –7.8 –1.0 0.7 –6.0
Sikoku –1.9 13.1 44.4 –9.9 –2.9 2.0 –48.5
Kyusyu –15.7 0.3 22.6 –7.7 –2.3 –0.7 –27.9
Source: Authors’ computations based on surveys on drugs (MHW 1994–1996).
Table 9.6 Price Changes and Switching Eﬀects for Selected Drug Groups (%)
Switching Eﬀect
Three-Digit Group 1995 Cost Share 1996 Price Change 1995 1996 Total
131 2.2 –3.9 4.52 12.01 16.53
214 2.8 –6.7 3.56 5.95 9.51
217 3.0 –7.9 5.55 9.28 14.83
218 4.2 –2.8 2.95 –0.91 2.04
219 3.4 –8.8 5.55 10.54 16.09
232 4.0 –9.4 5.22 2.52 7.74
264 4.6 –11.7 1.94 2.93 4.87
422 3.7 –5.6 –1.19 5.79 4.6
613 7.6 –11.4 –0.14 9.64 9.5
721 3.5 –11.7 14.96 –7.04 7.92
Total 38.83 –3.30 1.44 1.93 3.40
Source: Authors’ computations based on surveys on drugs (MHW 1994–1996).
up by 3.4 percent. The relative magnitudes of the price changes and the
switching eﬀects vary widely across drug groups, but in the aggregate they
are almost equal.
Observations.We oﬀer the following conjectures based on these three years
of data:1. The drug-switching eﬀects work to increase the cost of drugs at an an-
nual rate of somewhere between 5 percent and 7 percent.
2. When there is no reduction in drug prices, the trend toward more pre-
scriptions pushes up total drug costs by nearly 2 percent, but when drug
prices are reduced, the trend is reversed and prescription probabilities con-
tribute to a 7 percent decline in drug costs.
3. During the 1994–1996 period, the reduction in drug prices and pre-
scription probability together barely oﬀset the drug-switching eﬀect.
9.3 Economic Incentives in Drug Choice
Many physicians strongly deny that their drug choices are aﬀected in any
way by economic incentives. Are their decisions purely based on medicine
and truly free from economics? In this section we examine physician selec-
tion behavior using a formal model to analyze a comprehensive dataset on
drugs chosen by physicians.
9.3.1 Selection Functions
Assume that a physician selects a drug out of J possible drugs using the
following selection function:
uik      kxi      kzk   εik,
where x is a vector of patient and provider characteristics, z is a vector
of drug characteristics, and ε is the error term. The drug’s proﬁt margin
is included as one of the elements of z, and the corresponding coeﬃcient
in   gives the direction and size of the inﬂuence of the proﬁt margin on
the physician’s selection. The physician selects drug j for patient i if and
only if
uij   uik, k   1, . . . , J.
If the error terms εik is independently and identically distributed as an ex-
treme value,5 then





















 k   zk  ,
where yi is the drug selected by the physician. By ﬁtting a multinomial logit
model we obtain estimates of the parameters of the criterion function.
As usual, because the choice model is estimated using data from patients
who were given at least one of the Jpossible drugs, only J– 1 criterion func-
tions can be estimated and only the diﬀerences in coeﬃcients between the
J – 1 drugs and the base drug can be determined.
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5. See chapter 5 of Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) for derivations.9.3.2 Data and Empirical Strategy
The MHW collects data for the Survey of Drugs from the same source
used to compile the Survey on Socialized Medicine: reimbursement claims
submitted by clinics and hospitals. The drug data contain drug identiﬁca-
tion codes, quantities prescribed, and the cost of drugs to individual pa-
tients. We have limited access to the 1994, 1995, and 1996 Surveys of Drugs
(MHW). The limitation is that the drug data contain only partial identiﬁ-
cation codes. The full drug identiﬁcation code consists of twelve alphanu-
meric characters, of which we have access to only the ﬁrst four. The ﬁrst
(and broadest) classiﬁcation category uses the ﬁrst three digits, and the sec-
ond category uses the ﬁrst four digits. If the price of a particular drug is
unique within its four-digit group, we can identify the drug using its quan-
tity and cost information, but if there are two or more drugs that have an
identical list price, exact identiﬁcation of individual drugs is impossible. A
data set on individual drug names and full chemical components has been
purchased separately from a commercial source for 1995, and additional
codes for the other years have been added manually.
In the drug data, each observation contains provider characteristics, pa-
tient characteristics (including sex, age bracket, and major disease), and
drug characteristics (including estimated out-of-pocket cost, proﬁt mar-
gin, and four-digit grouping). There are typically a large number of drugs
classiﬁed in any four-digit group, and several four-digit groups are con-
tained in each three-digit group (table 9.7).6 Thus, some aggregation of in-
dividual drugs is inevitable.
Using data on patients who were prescribed any drug in a given three-
digit group, we estimate two speciﬁcations of our multinomial logit model.
In the ﬁrst model, we use the four-digit groups as our dependent variable.
The diﬀerent drugs within a four-digit group provide variation in proﬁt
margins and out-of-pocket costs. Thus, in this model, a particular four-
digit group may become a physician’s favorite because it contains a very
proﬁtable drug. Whenever possible, we select the ﬁrst four-digit group in a
three-digit group as the base case because it usually has the smallest total
drug costs of the four-digit groups.
In the second model, we use the quintiles of drug prices in a given three-
digit group as our dependent variable. In addition to individual character-
istics, provider characteristics, proﬁt margins, and out-of-pocket costs,
dummy variables for each of the four-digit groups are included as inde-
pendent variables. Thus, this model tries to explain why expensive drugs
Why Do the Japanese Spend So Much on Drugs? 241
6. Our data set contains nine three-digit groups, twenty-nine four-digit groups, and 729
diﬀerent drugs with a suﬃcient number of observations for ﬁtting the selection models. See






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.are chosen: Is it because of patient characteristics, provider characteristics,
drug characteristics, or economic incentives? In order to maintain consis-
tency with the ﬁrst model, the base case has been set at the 1st quintile
whenever possible.
One possible criticism of these estimations is that there is a considerable
degree of arbitrariness in the Japanese pharmaceutical classiﬁcation sys-
tem. For example, within any three-digit group there is a large number of
drugs whose fourth digits are nine, which denotes all “other agents” in the
group. Typically these are drugs that could not be grouped with existing
drugs when they were introduced. As a result, many of the most popular
drugs in a group often belong to the “nine” category, although they may
not be similar at all. Thus, the dummy variables for the four-digit groups
may not be reliable, and we may be able to improve our estimation by us-
ing better drug classiﬁcation systems in the selection function.
Fortunately, in an attempt to test the feasibility of a reference price sys-
tem for Japan, a working group of MHW, consisting mainly of physicians
and pharmacologists, has constructed more homogeneous groups of drugs
for four categories: (a) peptic ulcers, (b) antihypertensives, (c) analgesics
and others, and (d) antibiotics and others. In order to move from the oﬃ-
cial classiﬁcation to these reference groups, we need to identify all drugs in
a given group. We were unable to do this for (a), (b), and (c). However, we
were able to identify most of the individual drugs in group (d) using price
diﬀerences. Our data regarding the new homogeneous groupings within
(d) are summarized in table 9.8. Since the ﬁrst two groups have fewer than
several hundred observations, we do not try to estimate their selection
functions separately. We only estimate functions for the last three groups
and for the antibiotic drugs group as a whole.
9.3.3 Results
First Model
Judging from the pseudo-R2 values, the estimated model ﬁts the data
very well, with most of the explanatory power provided by the proﬁt mar-
gin variable. Of the twenty four-digit group selection functions, this vari-
able was signiﬁcant in nineteen. An example of the estimated selection
function is shown for antihypertensives in table 9.9. The sizes of the coeﬃ-
cients are not intuitive, however, because of the comparative or conditional
nature of the estimated selection functions.
To interpret the estimated proﬁt margin coeﬃcients, we perform a sim-
ulation in which all proﬁt margins are set equal to zero without changing
prices. The result of the simulation is summarized in table 9.10. Although
the results vary from one three-digit group to another, in two of the groups
the reduction in total drug costs exceeds 30 percent. In three additional
groups this reduction exceeds 20 percent, and in two other groups it ex-

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ceeds 10 percent. Overall, the reduction amounts to almost 20 percent of
drug costs.
Second Model
We estimate the selection functions for all nine groups, but we only re-
port the results for antihypertensives (214; table 9.11). Roughly speaking,
in the second model, the physician selects the cost of the drug. This
straightforward model makes it very easy to interpret the results. The mag-
nitudes of the coeﬃcients on the proﬁt margin variables are very stable, but
their pattern of variation suggests that proﬁt margins are relatively more
important in inducing selection of higher-priced drugs. Also, by compar-
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Table 9.9 Selection Function for Antihypertensives, Model 1 
(multinomial regression)
Group 2144 Group 2149
Variable Coeﬃcient z Coeﬃcient z
Proﬁt margin 0.266 223.058 0.220 186.088
Out-of-pocket costs 0.004 3.851 0.010 8.927
Number of beds 0.000 8.800 0.000 7.598
Female –0.218 –18.495 –0.171 –14.843
Age 0–19 13.699 0.083 14.766 0.090
Age 20–39 –0.440 –9.121 –0.677 –14.804
Age 40–59 0.112 5.989 0.301 16.380
Age 65–75 –0.340 –17.322 –0.023 –1.200
Age 76+ –0.207 –8.170 0.045 1.811
Circulatory diseases 0.115 9.415 0.168 14.057
Gm worker –0.419 –18.241 0.021 0.925
Gm dependent –0.647 –29.640 –0.722 –33.759
Gm elderly 0.245 7.486 0.193 6.082
Nh elderly 0.171 6.460 0.195 7.670
National –0.291 –17.518 –0.115 –7.092
University 0.760 10.237 0.955 13.025
Clinic with beds 0.557 30.631 0.634 35.622
Clinic without beds –0.707 –45.492 –0.910 –59.956
Constant –1.571 –62.090 –0.800 –32.398
N 1,214,398
Log-likelihood –883,404.8
LR  2 (36) 270,078.53
Prob    2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.1326
Source: Authors’ computations based on surveys on drugs (MHW 1994–1996).
Note: Outcome choice circulatory diseases = a dummy variable for patients with circulatory
disease as their primary disease. Gm- = patients under government managed insurance. Nh-
= patients under town- or city-managed national health insurance. National = patients of







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.ing the dummy variables7 for 2144 and 2149 we see that while 2144 is more
popular, 2149 probably does not oﬀer many products in the lower three
price zones. Patient characteristics seem to be important in deciding which
price zone to select: The elderly seem to be very important in accounting
for the highest-priced drugs.
In order to give an idea of the interpretation of the size of the estimated
proﬁt margin coeﬃcients, we carry out a simulation identical to that in the
ﬁrst model. The results of the simulation are summarized in table 9.12. In
four groups the reduction in total drug costs exceeds 50 percent. In four ad-
ditional groups this reduction exceeds 30 percent, and in the remaining
group it exceeds 4 percent. Overall, the reduction amounts to 45 percent of
drug costs.
Using Reference Price Group Information
Using the framework of the second model and the reference group in-
formation of the Working Committee of the MHW in 1998, we estimate se-
lection functions for three individual reference groups and antibiotics (as
a whole). Presumably, drugs within reference groups are close substitutes,
but there seems to be important heterogeneity among them. For example,
we have noticed that in some cases the most expensive drugs are not nec-
essarily the most proﬁtable, even though they are used most frequently and
were introduced most recently. One can think of several reasons why this
may happen:
1. Newer drugs may be preferred by physicians because they reﬂect
technological innovation and hence are better in some sense, even though
they may not be the most proﬁtable drugs in the group.
2. Manufacturers may be more reluctant to oﬀer large discounts for new
drugs because doing so will shorten their economic life.
3. The government may have become more stringent in pricing new
drugs in an attempt to control drug costs.
In order to capture these eﬀects we add a new variable indicating the year
each drug was introduced. There are two exceptions to this rule: (a) if the
drug is a “me-too” drug, we chose the ﬁrst year the particular chemical was
approved; (b) if the drug had already been approved at the beginning of our
sample we treat it as having been introduced in 1967.8 If physicians prefer
drugs that are more proﬁtable, “new,” or both, we expect the year variable
to work in the same way as the proﬁt margin variable.
Table 9.13 reports the results for the largest group, antibiotic agents for
gram-negative and –positive bacteria. The estimation results are fairly con-
250 Seiritsu Ogura and Takehiko Hagino
7. The base-case four-digit class is 2140 in this case.
8. Nihon-seiyaku-danntai-rengoukai, Hoken-yakka-kenkyu-iinkai (1997) includes data on























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 9.13 Selection Function for Antibiotic Agents for Gram-positive and Gram-
negative Bacteria, Model 2
Variable Coeﬃcient z Marginal Eﬀect
Quintile 1
Proﬁt margin –0.16 –212.57 –0.16
Year introduced –0.57 –155.64 –0.88
Number of beds 0.00 –9.26 0.00
Female –0.85 –37.84 –0.95
Age 0–19 –2.50 –46.14 –3.24
Age 20–39 0.21 3.99 0.33
Age 40–59 –0.96 –17.19 –0.95
Age 65–75 –2.21 –27.50 –2.23
Age 76+ –3.29 –25.35 –3.41
Circulatory diseases 1.66 30.23 1.70
Respiratory diseases 1.35 49.45 1.41
Gm worker 0.41 12.70 0.28
Gm dependent –0.54 –20.11 –0.62
Gm elderly 0.23 1.71 0.22
Nh elderly 0.90 9.88 0.95
Public Hospital 0.04 0.61 0.02
University –9.53 –0.07 –9.22
Clinic with beds 0.82 16.62 0.73





LR  2 (76) 3,145,966.69
Prob    2 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.4889
Quintile 2
Proﬁt margin –0.10 –345.91 –0.10
Year introduced –0.22 –152.29 –0.52
Number of beds –0.01 –44.42 –0.01
Female 0.05 4.93 –0.04
Age 0–19 0.63 23.26 –0.11
Age 20–39 0.84 30.62 0.97
Age 40–59 –0.63 –20.36 –0.61
Age 65–75 –1.45 –35.47 –1.47
Age 76+ –1.27 –22.42 –1.39
Circulatory diseases 1.35 52.05 1.39
Respiratory diseases 0.76 58.66 0.82
Gm worker –0.18 –10.78 –0.31
Gm dependent –0.65 –51.95 –0.73
Gm elderly 0.36 6.19 0.35
Nh elderly 0.83 18.49 0.89
Public Hospital 0.27 10.31 0.26
University –11.64 –0.07 –11.33
Clinic with beds 0.25 8.91 0.15
Clinic without beds 0.27 9.65 0.16
Constant 15.44 171.22
(continued)sistent with those from the other three groups. Larger proﬁt margins and
later introduction years increase the selection of more expensive drugs.
The sensitivity is larger for more expensive drugs. In other words, physi-
cians can be very easily persuaded to choose more expensive drugs if either
their proﬁt margins are larger or they are newer. They can also be very eas-
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Table 9.13 (continued)
Variable Coeﬃcient z Marginal Eﬀect
Quintile 3
Proﬁt margin –0.02 –169.93 –0.02
Year introduced 0.11 134.24 –0.19
Number of beds 0.00 –20.65 0.00
Female –0.15 –28.11 –0.24
Age 0–19 2.06 126.79 1.32
Age 20–39 0.42 24.24 0.55
Age 40–59 0.24 13.29 0.25
Age 65–75 –0.04 –1.73 –0.06
Age 76+ 0.26 8.05 0.14
Circulatory diseases 0.20 14.34 0.24
Respiratory diseases 0.06 8.93 0.11
Gm worker –0.04 –3.83 –0.17
Gm dependent –0.02 –4.01 –0.10
Gm elderly 0.06 1.72 0.06
Nh elderly 0.33 12.85 0.38
Public Hospital 0.19 14.38 0.18
University –0.87 –10.09 –0.56
Clinic with beds 1.07 84.55 0.98
Clinic without beds 0.73 58.77 0.63
Constant –8.70 –160.91
Quintile 4
Proﬁt margin n.a. 0.00
Year introduced n.a. –0.30
Number of beds n.a. 0.00
Female n.a. –0.10
Age 0–19 n.a. –0.74
Age 20–39 n.a. 0.12
Age 40–59 n.a. 0.01
Age 65–75 n.a. –0.02
Age 76+ n.a. –0.12
Circulatory diseases n.a. 0.04
Respiratory diseases n.a. 0.05
Gm worker n.a. –0.13
Gm dependent n.a. –0.08
Gm elderly n.a. –0.01
Nh elderly n.a. 0.05
Public Hospital n.a. –0.01
University n.a. 0.31
Clinic with beds n.a. –0.09
Clinic without beds n.a. –0.11
Constant n.a.Why Do the Japanese Spend So Much on Drugs? 255
Table 9.13 (continued)
Variable Coeﬃcient z Marginal Eﬀect
Quintile 5
Proﬁt margin 0.00 55.15 0.00
Year introduced 0.74 870.17 0.44
Number of beds 0.00 23.74 0.00
Female 0.27 68.52 0.17
Age 0–19 1.46 175.51 0.72
Age 20–39 –0.40 –47.88 –0.27
Age 40–59 –0.08 –9.66 –0.07
Age 65–75 0.06 5.18 0.04
Age 76+ 0.25 15.67 0.13
Circulatory diseases –0.14 –17.27 –0.10
Respiratory diseases –0.15 –33.27 –0.10
Gm worker 0.34 59.08 0.21
Gm dependent 0.21 41.95 0.13
Gm elderly 0.01 0.34 0.00
Nh elderly –0.20 –16.24 –0.15
Public Hospital –0.01 –0.75 –0.02
University –0.58 –24.35 –0.27
Clinic with beds 0.02 3.23 –0.07
Clinic without beds 0.12 20.42 0.02
Constant –46.97 –824.83
Source: Authors’ computations based on surveys on drugs (MHW 1994–1996).
Note: Outcome of 4th quintile for nonelderly male covered by a national health insurance
program treated in a private hospital is the comparison group. “Gm” stands for a person cov-
ered by health insurance managed by government. “Nh” stands for a person covered by a na-
tional health insurance program. N.a. = not applicable.
ily persuaded not to use the least expensive drugs if either their proﬁt mar-
gins are smaller or they are older. For antibiotic drugs as a whole the same
tendencies are conﬁrmed, but much more emphasis seems to be placed on
recent introduction, particularly for the most expensive drugs.
Again, we have carried out simulations for the zero proﬁt-margin case
(table 9.14). For the ﬁrst group, the reduction in total costs is about 30 per-
cent. For the second group, this reduction is about 20 percent, and for the
third group, it is computed to reach close to 70 percent, although this ﬁg-
ure may be unrealistic.
9.4 Ineﬃciencies in the Japanese Drug Price System
9.4.1 Ineﬃciency in the Production of Health Care Services
Under the present drug-pricing policy, providers of health care services
are subject to strong economic incentives to prescribe as many drugs as
possible to their patients. The wrong economic incentives can distort pro-































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.lection decision among competing drugs, and second, they may inﬂuence
the physician’s selection decision between drugs and other factors of pro-
duction, including physician services:
1. If providers are to produce their services eﬃciently, they must select
the least-cost combination of production factors from all feasible combi-
nations of inputs. If drug A and drug B have identical chemical composi-
tions, the eﬃcient provider must choose the one that costs less. But a sys-
tem that gives diﬀerential proﬁt margins across drugs tends to drive
providers toward using the drug with the highest proﬁt margin. This is usu-
ally the drug with the higher price. We have shown that this ineﬃciency can
amount to as much as 30 percent of total expenditures on drugs.
2. In many realistic cases, moreover, there is a certain degree of substi-
tutability between drugs and physicians’ time (counseling). Under the
present medical pricing system, in which physicians’ time is not adequately
reimbursed and proﬁt margins are provided for drugs, it is certain that
drugs are selected over other time-intensive procedures.
9.4.2 Substitution of New Drugs
If drug discounts had remained within the reasonable zones, drug prices
could not have been continuously lowered throughout the 1990s. This is ev-
idence that competition for larger shares among drug companies has been
very eﬀective in driving down prices. We should, however, also note that
large numbers of drugs have been introduced simultaneously. In fact, as we
have seen in the decomposition analysis, the drug companies seem to have
been able to oﬀset reductions in prices of existing drugs by introducing new
drugs and setting their prices suﬃciently high.
The introduction of new drugs, however, came at a cost. The drug com-
panies have been engaged in some of the most intensive research and devel-
opment activity in Japan’s major industries. In 1995, for example, the indus-
try spent 640 billion yen out of sales of 8 trillion yen, or 8 percent, on
research and development (R&D). In contrast, one of the most competitive
industries in Japan, the electronics and communications industry, spent only
5 percent of sales on R&D (ﬁgure 9.1). Such an intensive R&D eﬀort in our
drug industry may have been encouraged by several factors: (a) The costs of
R&D for new drugs are taken into account when the government sets the re-
imbursement price for the ﬁrst time; (b) high prices make it possible for ﬁrms
to oﬀer discounts to providers, thereby rapidly expanding sales and prof-
itability; and (c) without new drugs, ﬁrms’ proﬁtability declines continu-
ously as the prices of existing drugs are repeatedly cut by the government.
9.4.3 Dynamic Ineﬃciency
The Japanese drug industry, with the second largest domestic market in
the world, has enjoyed very high proﬁtability (ﬁgure 9.2). It is supported by


























































































































pthe highest R&D rates among Japan’s major industries. The story, however,
may not lead to such a happy ending if one looks into the industry more
closely. In fact, it is possible that these impressive R&D expenditures may
have actually weakened the industry rather than strengthening it. To the
extent that they were induced by regulation, these R&D expenditures are
simply the costs of operating under this unproductive regulation.
The statistics on the international drug trade are our ﬁrst clue that there
is something very strange about the industry. According to MHW statis-
tics, drug exports amount to less than one-tenth of drug imports. Further-
more, in terms of the regional pattern of trade, almost half of the exports
go to countries in Asia, whereas most of the imports are from the United
States and Europe (table 9.15). This indicates the presence of substantial
technological gaps among these regions, with Japan in a middle position.
An analysis of drug patent data from the world’s 150 largest companies
(Anegawa 1996) reaches a similar conclusion: 53 percent of the world’s
technological capital is found in the United States, 36.6 percent in Europe,
and only 10.1 percent in Japan. These ﬁndings are consistent with the hy-
pothesis that Japanese drug price controls have generated excess returns to
“new” drugs, which are similar to existing drugs, or “me-too” drugs. Most
of the R&D expenditure has been allocated to copycat development rather
than to truly innovative drugs.
By its nature, investment in innovative drugs involves higher risk, and
under the Japanese regulatory scheme, the lower-risk investment into de-
veloping “me-too” drugs has proved just as proﬁtable. It is not surprising
that one ﬁnds that most of the R&D funds of Japanese drug ﬁrms are allo-
cated to these easier alternatives. The process of approving and pricing
“new” drugs has long been notorious for its disregard of public accounta-
bility, scientiﬁc objectivity, and global standards.9 In fact, there are a large
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Table 9.15 Japanese Drug Imports and Exports (Billion Yen)
All Exports All Imports from the Imports from
Production Exports Asia Imports United States Europe
1985 4,001 30 18 308 129 162
1986 4,280 30 19 330 122 193
1987 4,825 30 19 355 117 225
1988 5,059 28 21 376 118 242
1989 5,502 27 19 417 123 278
1990 5,595 36 18 469 133 322
1991 5,697 42 24 485 129 343
1992 5,574 49 26 588 129 433
1993 5,695 44 23 584 131 430
Source: MHW (1999), Yearbook of Production Statistics for the Pharmaceutical Industry 1999
9. A new process, called good clinical practice (GCP), was adopted in 1998 as a result of
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Fig. 9.3 Distribution of the number of drug groups given to outpatients with circu-
latory diseases 
Source: Survey on Socialized Medicine (MHW 1994–1996).
number of drugs that are widely used in Japan but are not approved in the
United States or Europe because their producers cannot oﬀer suﬃcient ev-
idence of increased eﬀectiveness and superiority over existing drugs.10
9.4.4 External Diseconomies: Excessive Usage
The wrong economic incentives for the use of drugs may be generating
very serious external diseconomies. Elderly patients are prescribed a par-
ticularly large number of drugs under the present system. According to the
Survey on Socialized Medicine (MHW 1994–1996), the cost of drugs and
injections for an elderly outpatient was 905 points11 in 1996, almost twice
the 477 points for the rest of the population. Using the new drug data com-
piled by the government,12 we examine drug consumption more closely by
selecting patients with circulatory diseases, the most prevalent diseases
among the elderly.
Figure 9.3 illustrates that 25 percent of patients aged seventy and up re-
ceived four or more groups of drugs, compared with 10.2 percent of pa-
tients aged thirty-one to sixty. Likewise, 10.6 percent of patients aged sev-
enty and up consumed more than six groups of medicine. The risk of side
eﬀects tends to increase exponentially with the number of drugs consumed,
and this is particularly acute among elderly patients with diminished liver
10. Recently, however, the MHW has changed its policy and started to remove some drugs
widely used for cerebrovascular diseases due to lack of clinical eﬀectiveness.
11. A point is 10 yen in government reimbursement schedule.
12. The drug data set is explained in detail in section 9.3.2.and kidney functions. Moreover, many elderly patients utilize multiple pro-
viders, so the risks due to consumption of large numbers of drugs are nei-
ther controlled nor managed.
A somewhat separate issue exists with antibiotics. The distribution of
antibiotics used in Japanese hospitals is concentrated very heavily among
the latest generation of drugs, whereas other major countries continue to
use older-generation drugs. In fact, it is not unusual to ﬁnd new antibiotics
being given to patients in outpatient settings with such mild aﬄictions as a
common cold, a practice that runs a high risk of creating drug-resistant
bacteria strains. This is another external diseconomy created by a regula-
tory system that deprives health care providers of the incentive to use less
expensive, but still eﬀective, existing drugs.
9.5 Various Reform Proposals
In view of the serious distortions created by the present drug-pricing
policy, it is not surprising that a number of reform proposals have been ad-
vocated in the past three years. We review the merits and demerits of these
proposals as reported by a government commission in January 1998.
9.5.1 Reimbursement of Actual Drug Costs (Liberal Democrats)
A body of ruling parties, including the Liberal Democrats, argue that the
government should abandon drug price regulation altogether and move to-
ward reimbursing providers the purchase costs of the drugs. The govern-
ment commission objects to this plan on several grounds. First, patients
will be charged diﬀerently from one provider to another. Second, patients
will shop for better prices and choose large hospitals to get lower costs of
drugs. Third, administrative costs will be huge for both insurers and pro-
viders. Fourth, providers may engage in such rent-seeking activities as uti-
lizing extra middlemen to increase drug costs. The commission concludes
that this plan should be modiﬁed at least to the extent that only the lesser
of actual costs and list price is reimbursed.
9.5.2 Insurers Acting as Purchasing Agents
The second proposal the commission examined advocates a system in
which drugs are purchased by insurers and supplied to providers as they
are dispensed to their patients. Prices would be negotiated between manu-
facturers and insurers in the market. The commission asserts that although
proﬁt margins will vanish completely in this system, two problems will re-
sult: (a) Providers will have strong incentives to give excessive amounts of
drugs to patients, as they lose track of drug costs; and (b) providers will
have no incentive to use less expensive drugs. A variation on this was ad-
vocated by the Japan Medical Association (JMA) in a last-minute eﬀort to
abort the reference price system MHW was about to introduce. The JMA
262 Seiritsu Ogura and Takehiko Haginoasked the government to purchase all drugs that providers need for patients
with public health insurance.
9.5.3 Reference Price System of the MHW
Finding the other alternatives unacceptable, the commission considered
the reference price system. In this system, ﬁrst drug manufacturers an-
nounce list prices, and then the government sets a single reimbursement
price for all drugs in a given homogeneous group. The reimbursement price
would be set equal to a weighted average of the list prices in each group.
The majority of commission members found this system to be the most de-
sirable system, because it promotes price competition among substitutable
drugs and allows manufacturers to price their own products. The member
of the commission who represents JMA, however,  opposed this plan
strongly, presumably because JMA members would lose tremendous in-
come by moving to this system. The JMA would agree to move to a diﬀer-
ent system only if it is allowed to recover its losses elsewhere in the fee
schedule. Drug companies, particularly powerful drug companies, were
not happy either. They feared that patients would not be willing to bear ad-
ditional costs if they priced their products above the reimbursement prices,
so they would lose part of their premium on higher-quality products. They
also feared that the system would be open to considerable intervention by
the MHW, as it depends critically on how broadly or how narrowly each
reference group is deﬁned. In view of this strong opposition, the ruling par-
ties decided to mothball the plan just prior to the formation of the ﬁscal
year (FY) 1999 government budget plan.
9.5.4 Removing Drug Costs from Public Health Insurance
Although no one has advocated this option so far, it is a logical alterna-
tive, given that the government will continue to regulate drug prices in one
way or another as long as drugs are covered by public health insurance. It
is hard to imagine, however, that a majority of Japanese will want to re-
move drug costs completely from the provisions of public health insurance.
On the other hand, if options are oﬀered to the public to retain drug cov-
erage at full insurance charges or to give up the coverage for lower charges,
there may be a substantial portion of the public who would be willing to
take the risk or to buy private drug insurance.
9.6 Conclusions
We have presented empirical evidence to show that the periodic reduc-
tions in drug prices were mostly on paper and that they were largely oﬀset
by providers who switched to more expensive drugs and used a larger num-
ber of drugs for the same patients. Drug companies have continually in-
troduced “new” drugs into the market to replace “old” drugs, and the
Why Do the Japanese Spend So Much on Drugs? 263government has approved these “new” drugs at considerably higher reim-
bursement rates than those of the drugs they replaced.
We have also shown that there is strong evidence that physician drug
choice is inﬂuenced by drug proﬁt margins. In fact, our results suggest that
if the proﬁt margins of drugs disappeared overnight, total drug costs would
be reduced by 20 percent to 50 percent. This reduction is achieved even
when the probability of using a given drug remains unchanged and drug
prices are kept constant.13
In 1998, in an attempt to move away from the current price regulation
system, the government commission in charge examined a number of al-
ternative drug pricing schemes and chose the reference price system. Un-
der this system, producers ﬁrst set list prices, and then the government sets
a maximum reimbursement price for what it deﬁnes as a homogeneous
group of drugs. The adoption of the reference price system was blocked at
the last minute by strong opposition from JMA and drug companies. Ap-
parently the government is not yet ready to move to a free market for drugs,
but any option retaining elements of regulation presents its own set of
problems, some of which are fairly serious.
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